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DIVIDED WE FALL: THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION’S PROPOSAL FOR INDEPENDENT
MEMBER STATES TO REGULATE THE CULTIVATION OF
GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS
LAURA MOORE SMITH*
1.

INTRODUCTION

The European Union (EU) has the second largest amount of
arable land in the world, but grows less than 1% of the world‘s
genetically modified crops. 1 Believing this discrepancy in the ratio
of arable land to genetically modified organisms (GMOs) violated
a number of trade agreements, the United States, Argentina, a nd
Canada requested that the World Trade Organization (WTO)
review the EU‘s approval, application, and regulation of GMOs.2
In 2006, the WTO found that the EU had essentially suspended the
approval of GMOs, resulting in a de facto moratorium on biotech
products with a significant impact on the world market. 3 The
WTO agreed with the United States and other parties that the de
facto moratorium was an ―across-the-board marketing ban‖ of
GMOs and violated the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary

* J.D. candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School, 2012; B.A., The Co llege of Wooster, 2006. I would like to thank Professor Howard F. Chang for his
time and expertise. All errors and omissions are my own.
1 Debra M. Strauss, Feast or Famine: The Impact of the WTO Decision Favoring
the U.S. Biotechnology Industry in the EU Ban of Genetically Modified Foods, 45 AM .
BUS. L.J. 775, 778 (2008).
2 See Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting the Approval and
Marketing of Biotech Products, WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R (Sept.
29, 2006) at 2–3 (describing the establishment a WTO panel to review the European Community‘s approval method for biotech products and certain prohib itions
that member States impose on the marketing of biotech products).
3 See id. at 41 (―In terms of form, the moratorium consists of concerted acts and
omissions of the European Communities and its member States to stall decisionmaking with respect to biotech product applications at key stages of the approval
process.‖).
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and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement). 4 In a 2010 response
to the WTO, the EU proposed to Member States that each nation
may decide whether or not to cultivate GMOs within their borders.
While this proposal to decentralize GMO cultivation decisionmaking may better protect against risks associated with scientific
uncertainty, decentralization is unsuitable for the EU‘s common
marketplace due to the potential harm of GMO contamination and
high transaction costs. Instead, the EU should form a Communitywide decision-making body to determine the effects of GMOs and
approve appropriate biotechnologies through a precautionary
principle lens.
This Comment will explore the issues surrounding the control
of GMOs in the EU and why a centralized regulatory system is the
best approach given the unique relationship between EU Member
States. Section 2 will discuss the history of the WTO‘s 2006
decision and the EU‘s 2010 proposal. Section 3 will discuss the
benefits of a centralized decision-making process regarding GMO
cultivation. Section 4 will evaluate the EU‘s decentralized
approach and describe the inefficiencies of the proposal given the
distinctive nature of the EU‘s Common Market.
2.

GMOS IN THE WORLD MARKET

On July 13, 2010, the EU proposed a regulation of the European
Parliament and Council to allow Member States to decide whether
to cultivate GMOs within their borders. 5 Under the proposal, the
4 See id. at 41–44 (explaining how the moratorium violates the various provisions of the SPS Agreement).
5 See, e.g., Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
amending Directive 2001/18/EC as Regards the Possibility for the Member States to Restrict or Prohibit the Cultivation of GMOs in Their Territory, at 2, COM (2010) 375 final (July 13, 2010) [hereinafter EU 2010 Proposal] (explaining that ―[t]he European
Union authorisation system is aimed at avoiding adverse effects of GMOs on human and animal health and the environment while establishing an internal market for those products‖). By 2003, six member states had invoked ―safeguard provisions‖ under EC Directive 90/220 (France, Germany, Austria, Italy,
Luxembourg, and Greece), five member states banned the marketing of GMOs
(Austria, France, Germany, Italy, and Luxembourg), and one member state
banned the import of GMOs (Greece). Panel Report, supra note 2, at 31. Furthermore, Austria prohibited the marketing of three specific biotech maizes (Bt-176,
MON810, and T25), France prohibited two rapeseed products (MS1/RF1 and
Topas 19/2), Luxembourg and Germany prohibited one type of maize (Bt-176),
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EU retains the right to decide what GMO seeds may be placed on
the market, and Member States cannot interrupt the free circulation
of products containing GMOs, GMO seeds, or related planting
materials.6 Member States also may not affect the cultivation of
plants that have an adventitious presence or ―technically
unavoidable traces‖ of any GMO approved by the EU. 7 The
European Parliament adopted the proposal at its first reading on
July 5, 2011. 8
2.1. GMOs and the 2006 World Trade Organization Panel Report
The EU‘s proposal was in response to a 2006 panel report by
the WTO that the EU‘s approach to GMOs violated the SPS
Agreement.9 Under the SPS Agreement, states cannot arbitrarily or
unjustifiably discriminate against another member‘s products
when ―identical or similar conditions prevail.‖ 10 Nations are
allowed to take appropriate, discriminatory actions against
products ―if there is a scientific justification.‖ 11
Scientific
justification is established through a risk assessment on the impact
to ―human, animal, or plant life or health . . . .‖ 12 Nations must
take into account risk assessment techniques such as processes and

Italy prohibited four types of maize (Bt-11, MON810, MON 809 and T25), and
Greece prohibited the importation of Topas 19/2, an oilseed rape. Id.
6 See EU 2010 Proposal, supra note 5, at 12 (explaining that the relevant Directives pertain only to the cultivation of GMOs, but not to their free circulation).
7 Id.
8 Procedure File, Genetically Modified Organisms GMOs: Possibility for the Member States to Restrict or Prohibit the Cultivation of GMOs in Their Territory (amend. Directive 2001/18/EC) (July 5, 2011), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu
/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P7-TA-2011-0314.
9 See Panel Report, supra note 2, at 681 (describing the Panel‘s evidence for its
conclusion that the Group of Five Countries and Commission had effected a mo ratorium without having adopted an EC rule or decision-making process).
10 See Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures,
art. 2(3), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 494 [hereinafter SPS Agreement] (providing
that members are to ―ensure that their sanitary and phytosanitary measures do
not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between Member[] [States] where
identical or similar conditions prevail‖).
11 Id. art. 3(3).
12 See id. art. 5(1) (describing what assessments sanitary or phytosanitary
measures should be based upon).
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production methods, sampling and testing, and the prevalence of
disease.13
In May 2003, the United States, Argentina, and Canada
requested consultation with the EU regarding its policies on
biotechnology, claiming that the EU had placed a moratorium on
approving GMOs since October 1998 in violation of their trade
treaties.14 After failing to come to an agreement, the United States
requested that the WTO establish a panel to review the dispute. 15
The WTO found that the EU directives on GMOs fell clearly within
the authority of the SPS Agreement and that the EU had effectively
enacted a moratorium on GMOs between June 1999 and August
2003,16 in violation of the first clause of Annex C(1)(b) and Article 8
of the SPS Agreement. 17 The Panel found that five countries—

Id. art. 5(2).
See Panel Report, supra note 2, at 1 (introducing the procedural history of
the three states‘ complaints). Before 1998, the EC had approved over ten biotech
products, after which the EU suspended their approval process and no new biotech products had been approved since October 1998. Id. at 27–28. Although the
EU never formally adopted a ban on GMOs, EU officials have acknowledged the
moratorium. Id. at 19–20. The EU went on to note in its First Written Submission
that it wished to:
underline from the very beginning that it has not adopted any
general position either in favour or against any of the products
subject to these proceedings. In accordance with its regulatory
framework, the European Communities assesses each individual GMO on its own merits, in order to evaluate the potential
benefits and risks of these novel products.
Id. at 64.
15 See id. at 3 (noting further that the dispute was over ―(1) the operation and
application by the European Communities of its regime for approval of biotech
products; and (2) certain measures adopted and maintained by EC members
States prohibiting or restricting the marketing of biotech products‖).
16 See id. at 612–13 (discussing a panel finding that a moratorium on GMO
approvals was established within the relevant time frame).
17 See id. at 682 (stating further that it was not necessary to determine whether
or not the EU violated Article XI:1 of the GATT). Article C(1)(a) reads: ―Members
shall ensure, with respect to any procedure to check and ensure the fulfilment of
sanitary or phytosanitary measures, that: such procedures are undertaken and
completed without undue delay and in no less favourable manner for imported
products than for like domestic products.‖ See SPS Agreement, supra note 10, Annex C(1)(a). Article 8 of the SPS Agreement notes:
Members shall observe the provisions of Annex C in the operation of control, inspection and approval procedures, including
national systems for approving the use of additives or for establishing tolerances for contaminants in foods, beverages or
13

14
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Denmark, Italy, France, Greece, and Luxembourg—declared in
1999 that they would ―do what was within their power‖ to ensure
that no GMOs were approved until the European Commission had
established guidelines on the labeling and traceability of
biotechnology.18 The WTO accepted the EU‘s argument that the
Commission believed that it could not approve GMOs without the
support of these five countries, 19 and noted that no GMOs were
approved on the Member State level between 1999 and 2003. 20
Regardless of the Five Countries‘ actions, however, the WTO noted
that the European Commission was not bound by the Member
States‘ position on GMOs and did not ―make full use of the
relevant procedures to complete the approval process.‖ 21
The EU‘s approval process is outlined in a 2001 Directive on
the deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified
organisms. Under the Directive, the decision whether to place a
GMO on the market begins with a Member State receiving
notification from an applicant. 22 If the GMO is to be placed on the
market for the first time, a ―competent authority‖ of the Member
State receiving the application must prepare a report. 23 After
forwarding the notification to other Member States, the lead
Member State reviews the notification, which includes

feedstuffs, and otherwise ensure that their procedures are not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement.
Id. art. 8.
18 See Panel Report, supra note 2, at 612 (explaining a panel finding that
showed a deliberate intent on the part of the Group of Five countries to prevent
approval of GMO applications).
19 See id. (noting that because of a declaration by the Group of Five countries,
the Commission did not think it could approve applications without the support
of member states).
20 See id. at 613 (noting that often one of the five member states cited the 1999
Declaration as a reason for disapproving GMO applications).
21 See id. at 613–14 (delineating reasons for the Panel‘s inference of the Commission's conduct).
22 See Directive 2001/18, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12
March 2001 on the Deliberate Release into the Environment of Genetically Modified Organisms and Repealing Council Directive 90/220/EEC, art. 13(1), 2001 O.J.
(L 106) (stating that ―a notification shall be submitted to the competent authority
of the Member State where such a GMO is to be placed on the market for the first
time‖).
23 See id. art. 15 (explaining that the competent authority ―shall give consent
in writing for placing on the market‖).
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environmental risk assessments, conditions for placing the
bioproduct on the market, a plan for monitoring, and a plan for
labeling and packaging the product. 24 The Member State then
prepares an assessment report within ninety days of receiving the
notification, indicating whether the GMO should be placed on the
market.25
No GMOs, furthermore, could be placed on the market unless
it was authorized under Regulation 1829/2003. 26 In accordance
with this regulation, Member States send GMO applications to the
European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) for scientific assessments
of the potential health and environmental risks. 27 The Member
State also performs an environmental risk assessment if the
application includes a request to cultivate the GMO. After all of
the information and opinions are published on the EFSA website
and circulated among Member States, the European Commission
solicits public opinion and decides whether to approve the
application.28
Despite these clear regulations and approval
procedures, however, the WTO found that the EU had not actually
approved any GMO products between 1999 and 2003, and had
only conducted risk assessments on fourteen of the twenty-seven
pending applications for biotech products. 29
During the WTO‘s review, the United States maintained that,
according to the scientific committees, there was no ―rational

Id. art. 13.
Id. art. 14.
26 See Commission Regulation 1829/2003, of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 22 Sept. 2003 on Genetically Modified Food and Feed, 2003 O.J. (L
268) 1, 2 (stating that genetically modified food and feed should only be placed in
the market after scientific evaluation by the European Food Safety Authority).
27 See European Food Safety Authority, EFSA‘s Role in the GMO Regulatory
Framework,
available
at
http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/gmotopics
/docs/gmoauthorisation.pdf (outlining the procedure under which GMO applications are assessed).
28 See id. (detailing the process for GMO application approval).
29 Panel Report, supra note 2, at 37. The risk assessments examined ―(1) the
likelihood of the establishment or spread of a pest, and (2) the potential for adverse effects on human or animal health arising from the presence of toxins or
disease-causing organisms in food or feedstuffs.‖ See also id. at 39 (―As the nature
of the risks associated with biotech products varies considerably from plant vari ety to variety, general assertions about the risks of biotech products, as a class,
cannot be made. Each biotech product needs to be evaluated on a case -by-base
basis, taking into consideration the factors outlined above.‖).
24
25
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relationship‖ between the EU‘s moratorium and the risk
assessments for the unapproved biotech products. 30 In response,
the EU contended that the ―complaining parties seek to evade or
ignore the whole socio-political, legal, factual, and scientific
complexity of the case‖ and that the GMOs in question had
characteristics that may pose potential threat to human and
environmental health. 31 GMOs, the EU insisted, are not the
equivalent to their non-biotech counterparts. 32 Nevertheless, the
WTO decided that the EU ―acted inconsistently with its obligations
under‖ the SPS Agreement.33
Two years after the WTO‘s decision, the Council of the
European Union issued a series of guidelines on GMOs.34 Noting
the necessity to improve the implementation of a GMO framework
and ―the necessity of continuing processing applications without
undue delays,‖ 35 the Council called for EFSA and Member States to
develop a framework for the authorization of GMOs that took into
consideration environmental assessment and monitoring
arrangements, socio-economic benefits and risks, the expertise of
the scientific community, a labeling system for GMO seeds, and the
possibility for protected areas. 36 Specifically, the Council noted
that EFSA should develop and update transparent guidelines to

30 See id. at 37 (arguing that product-specific moratoria are inconsistent with
the SPS agreement because they are not based on the European Communities‘ risk
assessments).
31 Id. at 64–65 (detailing the European Communities‘ responses to complaints
filed against them).
32 See id. at 65–66 (arguing, overall, that the EU did not delay in reviewing
applications and was not in violation of the SPS Agreement).
33 See id. at 682; see also SPS Agreement, supra note 10, at annex C(1)(a)
(providing the requirements of Annex C(1)(b) of the SPS Agreement, which are to
check and ensure sanitary and phytosanitary measures).
34 Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on Genetically Modified Organisms 2 (Dec. 5, 2008), available at http://register.consilium.europa.eu
/pdf/en/08/st16/st16882.en08.pdf (―It is therefore necessary to look for improvement of the implementation of this legal framework [for the authorization of
GMOs] in order to better meet the objectives of the EC legislation, taking into co nsideration the necessity of continuing processing applications without undue delays and respecting the relevant EC international obligations.‖).
35 Id.
36 See id. at 2–8 (explaining in greater detail the way countries can better use
expertise, create labeling systems, and monitor arrangements).
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assess the environmental risks of GMOs. 37 Additionally, while the
Council did not mandate that Member States independently
regulate the cultivation of GMOs within their borders, they did
suggest the possibility. 38
2.2. The EU’s Response
On July 5, 2011, the European Parliament adopted at its first
reading the proposal amending the 2001 Directive. 39 In the
amended Directive, ―in accordance with Article 2(2)‖ [of the Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union] Member States should
―be entitled to have a possibility to adopt binding legislative
provisions concerning the cultivation of GMOs in their territory
after the GMO has been legally authorised to be placed on the EU
market.‖ 40 Member States are authorized to adopt case-by-case
restrictions or prohibitions regarding the cultivation of particular
GMOs or groups of GMOs. 41 While restrictions or prohibitions

37 See id. at 3 (noting the Commission‘s mandate ―to the EFSA to further develop and update its guidelines as regards the environmental risk assessments of
GMOs‖).
38 See id. (inviting member states to regulate the cultivation of GMOs).
39 See Report on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council Amending Directive 2001/18/EC as Regards the Possibility for the Member
States to Restrict or Prohibit the Cultivation of GMOs in Their Territory, Comm. on the
Env‘t, Pub. Health & Food Safety, at 5–6 (April 20, 2011), available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A7
-2011-0170&language=EN&mode=XML#_part1_def2 [hereinafter 2011 Amended
Proposal] (describing Directive 2001/18/EC as only allowing GMOs to be placed
on the market after specific environmental risk assessment is carried out).
40 Id. amend. 5. Article 2(2) of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European
Union provides:

When the Treaties confer on the Union a competence shared with the
Member States in a specific area, the Union and the Member States may
legislate and adopt legally binding acts in that area. The Member States
shall exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has not exercised its competence. The Member States shall again exercise their co mpetence to the extent that the Union has decided to cease exercising its
competence.
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art.
2(2), March 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 47 [hereinafter TFEU].
41 See 2011 Amended Proposal, supra note 39, amend. 15 (proposing Amendment 16 to Directive 18/EC/2001 for measures to be based on grounds other than
those related to the assessment of the adverse effect on health and the enviro nment).
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may be based on ―scientifically justified grounds relating to
environmental impacts which might arise from the deliberate
release or the placing on the market of GMOs,‖ 42 the amended text
enumerates a variety of reasons to exclude GMOs:
[T]he prevention of the development of pesticide resistance
amongst weeds and pests; the invasiveness or persistence
of a GM variety, or the possibility of interbreeding with
domestic cultivated or wild plants; the prevention of
negative impacts on the local environment caused by
changes in agricultural practices linked to the cultivation of
GMOs; the maintenance and development of agricultural
practices which offer a better potential to reconcile
production with ecosystem sustainability; the maintenance
of local biodiversity, including certain habitats and
ecosystems, or certain types of natural and landscape
features; the absence of adequate data or the existence of
contradictory data or persisting scientific uncertainty
concerning the potential negative impacts of the release of
GMOs on the environment of a Member State or region,
including on biodiversity. . . . [T]he impracticability or the
high costs of coexistence measures or the impossibility of
implementing coexistence measures due to specific
geographical conditions such as small islands or mountain
zones; the need to protect the diversity of agricultural
production; the need to ensure seed purity; other grounds
that may include land use, town and country planning, or other
legitimate factors.43
All Member States‘ measures, however, are limited to only the
cultivation of GMOs, not to ―the free circulation and import of
genetically modified seeds and plant propagating material, as or in
products, and of the products of their harvest.‖ 44 No Member State
may prevent or restrict the cultivation of authorized GMOs in
other Member States as long as those Member States take ―effective
measures‖ to prevent cross-border contamination. 45

42
43
44
45

Id. amend. 16.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. amend. 7.
Id. amend. 9.
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Notably, the amended 2011 Directive cites authority under
Article 192(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union, instead of Article 114 as cited by the 2001 Directive. 46
Article 114 allows the European Parliament and the Council to
enact legislation regarding the establishment and function of the
Common Market,47 while Article 192 allows the European
Parliament and Council to take action to preserve, protect, and
improve the environment and protect human health. 48 Reframing
the Parliament‘s authority to regulate GMOs under an
environmental lens and away from the economics of a Common
Market allows Member States to potentially restrict or prohibit
GMOs on ethical, social, and cultural grounds. 49
3.

THE CASE FOR CENTRALIZED DECISION-MAKING REGARDING
GMO CULTIVATION

The importance of food safety and the high spillover effects of
GMO contamination limit the effectiveness of prohibitions
promulgated by Member States. Centralized GMO regulation, on
the other hand, could deal with spillover effects while still
addressing location-specific concerns. Unlike environmental
regulation in the United States, centralized environmental
regulation in the EU considers both environmental concerns and
incentivizing the free movement of goods in the Common
Market.50 As a result, centralized environmental policies better

Id. amend. 1.
See TFEU, supra note 40, art. 114 (stating that the European Parliament and
Council shall ―adopt the measures for the approximation of the provisions laid
down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States which have as
their object the establishment and functioning of the internal market‖).
48 See id. art. 191, 192(1) (explaining that the policy of the European Parliament should have several human health and environmental protection objectives).
49 See EU Member States to be Allowed to Ban GM Crops, GMO SAFETY (July 6,
2011), http://www.gmo-safety.eu/news/1333.genetic-engineering-eu-parliament
-national-cultivation-ban.html (highlighting that ―‘scientific uncertainty‘ and socio-economic grounds‖ may serve as legitimate reasons for a national ban under
the amended proposal).
50 See Roger Van Den Bergh, Economic Criteria for Applying the Subsidiarity
Principle in European Environmental Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, THE ECONOMY
AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 80, 83 (Richard L. Revesz et al. eds., 2000) (arguing
that centralized environmental regulation in the United States arose well after
states were economically and politically integrated).
46
47
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account for efficiency in the marketplace while still taking into
account the specific circumstances of Member States.51
Under the Treaty of the European Economic Community,
furthermore:
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence,
the Community shall take action, in accordance with the
principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives
of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the
Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or
effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the
Community.52
In compliance with this principle of subsidiarity, environmental
directives have used four reasons for justifying Communitywide
actions:
the demands of ―transboundary environmental
pollution,‖ the ―need to create equal conditions‖ in the common
market, the regulation of the ―free movement of goods,‖ and the
―protection of ‗European environmental and cultural heritage‘ and
human health.‖ 53 When addressing GMOs, centralization is
appropriate because individual Member States cannot sufficiently
address neither GMO transboundary pollution, 54 the need to create
equal conditions for GMO and non-GMO goods,55 the demands of
regulating the free movement of GMO crops, 56 nor the effective
protection of health and the environment.57
3.1. Spillover Effects
Economist Wallace Oates‘s 1972 Decentralization Theorem
states that without spillovers, a decentralized system of
51 See id. (noting the importance of considering ―location-specific circumstances and regionally diversity‖ when establishing policies).
52 Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community
art. 5, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 42 (emphasis added).
53 Van Den Bergh, supra note 50, at 82 (citing EU Directives that exemplify
each reason for centralization).
54 See infra Section 3.1 (discussing spillover costs of GMO cultivation).
55 See infra Section 4.2 (noting the impact of GMO cultivation on the EU
Common Market).
56 See infra Section 3.3 (evaluating the ideological objections to and transaction costs associated with GMOs).
57 See infra Section 4.1 (considering whether the EU proposal will prevent
states from cultivating GMOs).
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government should be preferred to a centralized one. 58 Oates
writes:
It is generally desirable, as suggested by the condition of
the perfect correspondence in the ideal model, to
internalize, where possible, all the benefits and costs
associated with the provision of a particular good. In this
way decisions concerning levels of consumption will be
more likely to take into account the interests of all those
whose welfare they influence. 59
GMOs, however, have a high spillover cost in transboundary
contamination, making spillover costs one of the greatest issues
surrounding GMO cultivation. Unlike other WTO decisions
regarding EU foodstuffs, 60 GMOs have a unique impact on the
environment in that they can spread their altered genetic material
without human intervention through cross-pollination and
contaminate non-GMO crops and products. For example, although
only two GMOs are grown in the EU, 61 Greenpeace International‘s
and GeneWatch UK‘s ―GM Contamination Register‖ noted 141
instances of contamination by genetically modified organisms in
Europe between 1997 and 2010. 62 Such incidents include six

58 See WALLACE E. OATES , F ISCAL F EDERALISM 35 (1972) (summarizing the ―Decentralization Theorem‖).
59 Id. at 46.
60 See, e.g., Howard F. Chang, Risk Regulation, Endogenous Public Concerns, and
the Hormones Dispute: Nothing to Fear but Fear Itself?, 77 S. C AL . L. REV . 743, 745
(2004) (noting the WTO‘s decision in favor of the United States regarding its disagreement with the EU over banning meat containing hormones). The debate over
animal hormones, however, is dissimilar to GMOs since livestock often pr ovide
high control over breeding, and hormones are not passed from generation to generation as altered genetic material.
61 Press Release, Europa, Questions and Answers on the EU's New Approach
to the Cultivation of GMOs (July 13, 2010), http://europa.eu/rapid
/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/10/325&format=HTML&aged=0&la
nguage=EN&guiLanguage=en (observing that only one GM maize, MON 810,
and one GM potato, the Amflora potato, are ―commercially cultivated in the EU,‖
while other GMO products, including ―one sugar beet, three soybean, three
oilseed-rape, six cotton and seventeen maize products,‖ are authorized to be on
the EU market to be used as animal feed and for other uses).
62 GM Contamination Register, GENE WATCH UK & GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL ,
http://www.gmcontaminationregister.org (last visited Feb. 14, 2012) (providing
search results for incidents of contamination in Europe). The author‘s text accompanying notes 62–67 are based on 2010 data.
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reports of unauthorized GM flax FP967 in Finland, traceable to
shipments of seeds and products from other countries,63 and
numerous reports of contaminated maize seeds in Austria, 64
France,65 Italy,66 and other European nations. 67
Once contaminated seeds are introduced into an area, either
through mislabeled seeds or importing illegal GMOs, a GMO can
spread through cross-pollination, seed saving and planting,
planting equipment, and harvesting and storage practices. 68
Although the pollen of a single crop may not bound across nations
in a single season, the impact of GMO crops on national borders
and the dispersal of pollen over several generations cannot be
disregarded.69

63 See Finland—Continues to Find Unauthorised Linseed FP967 from Canada,
GENE WATCH
UK
&
GREENPEACE
INTERNATIONAL ,
http://www.gmcontaminationregister.org/index.php?content=re_detail&gw_id
=301&reg=0&inc=0&con=0&cof=0&year=2010&handle2_page= (last visited Feb.
14, 2012) (reporting that Finland informed the EU‘s Rapid Alert System for Food
and Feed (RASFF) of the incidents).
64 See
Austria—Greenpeace Reveal Contamination of Maize Seed,
GENE WATCH
UK
&
GREENPEACE
INTERNATIONAL ,
http://www.gmcontaminationregister.org/index.php?content=re_detail&gw_id
=46&reg=reg.1&inc=1&con=3&cof=0&year=0&handle2_page=0 (last visited Feb.
14, 2012) (reporting that laboratory tests of Austrian maize revealed Monsanto
and Novartis strains, both of which are genetically modified).
65 See France—GM Contamination of Maize Seed Reported, GENE WATCH UK
& GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL , http://www.gmcontaminationregister.org/index
.php?content=re_detail&gw_id=26&reg=reg.1&inc=1&con=3&cof=0&year=0&ha
ndle2_page=0 (last visited Feb. 14, 2012) (reporting on findings of the French
Government‘s Food Inspection Agency).
66 See Italy—Over One-Hundred Farmers Discovered that the Seeds they had
Bought and Planted were Contaminated by GM Maize, GENE WATCH UK &
GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL , http://www.gmcontaminationregister.org/index
.php?content=re_detail&gw_id=36&reg=reg.1&inc=1&con=3&cof=0&year=0&ha
ndle2_page=1 (last visited Feb. 14, 2011) (reporting that farmers in Northern Italy
―unknowingly planted 400 hectares with GM contaminated maize‖).
67 See generally GM Contamination Register, supra note 62 (highlighting incidents of contamination of seeds in Europe).
68 See Alison Peck, The New Imperialism: Toward an Advocacy Strategy for GMO
Accountability, 21 GEO. INT ‘L ENVTL . L. REV . 37, 43 (2008) (discussing sources of GM
contamination).
69 See, e.g., F RIENDS OF THE EARTH, Farmers Briefing: Genetically Modified Crops
and
Animal
Feed,
http://www.foe.co.uk/resource/briefings/gm_crops
_animal_feed.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2012) (noting predictions that maize crosspollination can occur over 500 meters, as well as cases of oilseed rape traveling 4
kilometers despite barriers erected to contain the pollen).
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Moreover, the threat of cross-pollination is not limited to seed
mingling and contamination in cultivation. In September 2011, the
Court of Justice of the European Union held that honey produced
from the pollen of genetically modified corn constituted ―food . . .
containing ingredients produced from [genetically modified
organisms] within the meaning of Article 3(1)(c) of Regulation No.
1829/2003,‖ regardless of whether the genetically modified pollen
was present intentionally or adventitiously. 70
In the case,
Monsanto‘s 810 maize was prohibited in Germany in 2009 by the
German Federal Office for Consumer Protection and Food Safety. 71
The Free State of Bavaria, however, owned land cultivated for
research purposes and grew Monsanto‘s 810 maize. 72 In 2005, a
neighboring beekeeper found trace amounts of MON 810 DNA in a
number of honey samples and claimed that his product was no
longer marketable or fit for consumption and was subjected to a
―material interference‖ under German law.73 Monsanto argued
that Regulation No. 1829/2003 was not applicable to GMOs found
in honey and, furthermore, honey could no longer contain a
―GMO‖ because the pollen in the honey no longer possessed any
capacity to reproduce. 74 The European Court of Justice agreed that
the pollen was no longer a ―genetically modified food‖ because it
had lost its ability to transfer genetic material, but disagreed that
Regulation 1829/2003 did not apply. 75 Because the honey was
―food produced from or containing ingredients produced from
GMOs,‖ it was subject to the EU‘s labeling laws. 76 Finding
70 Case C-442/09, Bablok v. Freistaat Bayern, 2011 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS
62009CJ0442, ¶ 109 (Sept. 6, 2011), available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu
/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=celex:62009CJ0442:en:html (ruling that genetically modified food and feed must be interpreted as a substance which has lost its
ability to reproduce) (internal quotation marks omitted); Commission Regulation
1829/2003, supra note 26, art. 3(1)(c).
71 Case C-442/09 ¶29 (2011) (discussing the cultivation of MON 810 maize
prohibited in Germany).
72 Id. ¶¶ 30, 32.
73 See id. ¶¶ 37, 39 (referring to MON 810 maize pollen as being no longer
marketable or fit for consumption).
74 See id. ¶¶ 43, 44 (arguing that Regulation No. 1829/2003 is not applicable
to MON 810 maize pollen found in honey because it does not have the capability
to reproduce).
75 Id. ¶¶ 108, 109.
76 Id. ¶ 109. The Court noted that the GMO pollen was an ―ingredient‖ of the
contaminated honey. Id. ¶ 79.
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otherwise would allow ―a foodstuff such as honey [to] . . . escape
any safety checks, even though it might contain significant
quantities of genetically modified material.‖ 77
Contamination costs have a tangible, important impact on EU
farmers and producers in both the creation and marketing of
goods. Bablok v. Bayern indicates that the European Courts will
literally interpret GMO restrictions and strictly apply labeling laws
such as Regulation No. 1829/2003, in which any foodstuffs
containing more than 0.9% of GMO products must be labeled as
containing GMOs.78 While the 0.9% level allows a low threshold
for adventitious presence and other unintended contamination of
traditionally grown crops, it in effect requires the segregation of
GMOs in all stages of production, handling, storage, shipment,
processing, and marketing. 79 If GMOs contaminate crops that are
marketed as organic or traditionally grown, those farmers will
have to label their products as containing GMOs. Although those
farmers may have invested heavily in keeping their crops organic
or traditional, they will lose any economic benefit of being able to
advertise as ―GMO-free.‖
3.2. Centralization Can Reduce Spillover Effects
The EU‘s decentralized proposal places a significant burden on
farmers in countries that prohibit the cultivation of GMOs.
Presumably, nations that decide to ban GMOs put a high
preference on traditionally grown crops; consumers in these
countries, in turn, would most likely not purchase or would
undervalue any crops contaminated by GMOs from a neighboring
nation. The contaminated goods can no longer freely move in the
market, and are no longer considered equal to their noncontaminated counterparts.
Under a centralized system, the EU could limit or internalize
the costs of spillover by uniformly prohibiting or allowing the
77 See id. ¶ 82 (discussing how the proposed interpretation would not be successful because foods such as honey escape safety checks for significant amounts
of genetically modified material).
78 Council Regulation 1829/2003, supra note 26, at 11 (regulating the labeling
of GMO food and feed).
79 See Strauss, supra note 1, at 813 (noting further that many American manufacturers have not marketed their products in the EU because this pr ocess is not
mandated in the United States).
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cultivation of a GMO. The EU as a central body can better take
into account the trans-boundary nature of GMO regulation. If
Bablok v. Bayern occurred in a centralized system, for example,
Bablok would not be unfairly burdened by his proximity to a
research field. While a centralized system could not stop the
contamination of his honey, all honey producers in Europe would
theoretically be exposed to the same risk (or not exposed,
depending on whether the MON 810 would be uniformly banned).
The benefits and costs of GMOs would not be limited to borders of
―GMO‖ and ―non-GMO‖ countries, but would either be reduced
by a ban or spread out by an approval.
3.3. Centralization and Lower Transaction Costs
In addition to the physical concern of contamination, the EU
must also address ideological objections. A recent poll conducted
on behalf of the European Commission indicates seventy percent
of Europeans agree that GM foods are ―fundamentally unnatural,‖
while only twenty-three percent believe that the development of
GMOs should be encouraged. 80 Before the decentralization
proposal, six nations—Austria, Hungary, France, Greece,
Germany, and Luxembourg—had already banned the cultivation
of Monsanto‘s GM maize, while Austria, Luxembourg, and
Hungary objected to the cultivation of the Amflora potato. 81
The ideological impact of GMOs is clearly illustrated in
Hungary, for example. In July 2011, the Ministry of Rural
Development outlawed the cultivation and sale of GMO
contaminated seeds. 82 Contaminated crops and crops in a buffer

80 European Commission, Special Eurobarometer 341: Biotechnology, at 18 (Oct.
2010),
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives
/ebs/ebs_341_en.pdf (presenting survey data on European attitudes towards genetically modified foods).
81 See Robert Wielaard, EU: Leave GMO Food Decisions for Governments,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (July 13, 2010, 11:38 AM), available at
http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9GU8H0G1.htm
(noting
sentiments among anti-GMO advocacy groups that the EU decision to allow states
to determine whether to permit GM crops exposes EU nationals to food and feed
contamination risks).
82 See The Ministry of Rural Development’s New GMO Statute in Effect, WEBSITE
OF
THE
HUNGARIAN
GOVERNMENT
(July
15,
2011,
5:51
PM),
http://www.kormany.hu/en/ministry-of-rural-development/news/theministry-of-rural-development-s-new-gmo-statute-in-effect (―In the case of seeds
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area surrounding the vicinity must be quarantined and destroyed
either by the crop producer or the Hungarian Central Agricultural
Office.83 On July 15, 2011, the day the law was put into effect, 940
hectares of GMO contaminated crops were destroyed and 2,500
hectares were slated to be deep ploughed. 84 According to the State
Secretary, ―keeping the country free of GMOs is an issue of
national strategy and security. Pure, GMO-free seed cultivation
and agriculture is a significant market advantage for Hungary.‖ 85
Importers and cultivators must balance anti-GMO legislation,
such as that in Hungary, against pro-GMO legislation in other
European nations, such as Romania. 86 Romania shares an
extensive border with Hungary but has a very different approach
to biotechnology. Before joining the EU in 2007, Romania was a
significant producer of GMOs. 87 Although Romania has since
banned the cultivation of all GMOs except for MON 810 maize,
Romania‘s Agriculture Minister Valeriu Tabara is adamant about
cultivating more GMOs in the future. 88 Minister Tabara has
requested the European Commission to reauthorize the cultivation
of GMOs in Romania, noting ―the agricultural potential of
Romania in assuring vegetable protein, food and feed fell
dramatically in 2007, once adhering to the EU, by banning GM
soy.‖ 89 ―Romania is losing around 1 billion euro per year,‖

produced in Hungary the producer is responsible for keeping seeds GMO free,
while in other cases the primary importer may be held accountable.‖).
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 We Don’t Need Genetically Manipulated Organisms, WEBSITE OF THE
HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT (Sept. 30, 2011, 7:16 PM), http://www.kormany.hu
/en/ministry-of-rural-development/news/we-don-t-need-geneticallymanipulated-organisms.
86 Spain is also a fervent supporter of GMOs. As of 2009 it cultivated nearly
seventy-five percent of all GMOs in the EU. See, Andrew Willis, Spain a Key Ally of
Pro-GMO America, Cables Reveal, EUOBSERVER.COM (Dec. 20, 2010, 9:51 AM),
http://euobserver.com/9/31544.
87 See Marian Chiriac, Romania to Push for Approval of GMO Soybeans,
BALKANINSIGHT (Apr. 12, 2011, 8:53 AM), http://www.balkaninsight.com
/en/article/romania-plans-to-grow-gm-soybeans.
88 See id. (statement of Valeriu Tabara) (―[W]e have to make every effort this
year in order to reach agreement within the European Union for cultivating and
exporting genetically modified soybeans.‖).
89 Romanian Agriculture Minister Puts His Money Where His Mouth Is, INFOMG
(Feb. 05, 2011), http://www.infomg.ro/web/en/Home/News/3/1287.
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Minister Tabara argued, ―because it does not cultivate genetically
modified soybeans.‖ 90
The imbalance between Hungary‘s and Romania‘s positions on
GMOs, in turn, significantly affects potential transaction costs.91 In
addition to spillover effects from cross-border contamination, 92
importers and enforcement agencies will incur costs to ensure
GMO-goods coming from and going to pro-GMO Romania do not
contaminate anti-GMO Hungarian cultivation. If the Member
States‘ only concern was between GMOs and uncontaminated,
traditionally grown products, each Member State could negotiate
their rights between neighbors and obtain a system that preserves
what they value most. 93 When dealing with a good as prolific and
fundamental as foodstuff, however, decentralization presents
exceedingly high costs in trading, inspecting, regulating, and
informing for producers, consumers, corporations, and
governments. As demonstrated in Eastern Europe (with the
exception of Romania where laws may be less severe),94 where
producers and importers are held strictly responsible for keeping
GMOs out of Hungarian fields, neighboring Member States and
international importers alike may accrue high costs in keeping
Hungary‘s soil GMO-free. Additionally, importers must consider
costs of importing GMO seeds and planting instruments to
countries where, in effect, it is illegal to use them. While the 2011
Amended Proposal only regards the cultivation of GMOs and not
the sale of GMOs, the actual effect on companies producing a good
that would be unusable in certain Member States cannot be
overlooked.
Chiriac, supra note 87.
See Louis Antoine, Ciolos Voices Misgivings About GMOs, EUROPOLITICS
(May 9, 2011), http://www.europolitics.info/ciolos-voices-misgivings-aboutgmos-art303301.html.
92 See supra Section 3.1 (noting that GMOs can spread their altered genetic
material through cross-pollination and contaminate non-GMO crops and products).
93 See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960)
(arguing that in a world without transaction costs, parties could rearrange rights
to achieve the optimum value of production).
94 See The Ministry of Rural Development’s New GMO Statute in Effect, supra
note 82 (―The Government decided . . . to act as forcefully as possible against
companies selling seeds contaminated with genetically modified organisms
(GMOs), and therefore requested the amendment of the Penal Code and the relevant legislation in order to ensure severe punishment and a strong deterrent.‖).
90

91
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As a comparison, a decentralized GMO regime between
Member States would be much like the emission standards of
California and the United States. Except for a few exemptions,
California laws forbid the use, sale, purchase, lease, rental, and
distribution of any new motor vehicle that has not been certified by
the state.95 By allowing two different emission standards, 96
manufacturers either have to build ―California standard cars‖ and
―federal standard cars,‖ or simply build cars for the more stringent
California standards (thus making separate federal standards
moot). Consumers, similarly, have to conduct more research to
ensure that they do not purchase a car that cannot be driven in
their home state, or, alternatively, do not spend additional funds
on a car that was built for standards that do not apply to them. 97
Motor vehicle importers and exporters need to monitor what
products may be sold in each state, while inspectors need to have
more control over imports and exports to ensure that they comply
with state standards.
Although stricter emission standards provided an overall
benefit for public health and the environment, the transaction costs
of the fragmented system raised a real concern. 98 After the federal
government enacted a law that will again centralize emission
standards under a federal rule, automakers ―welcomed a national
plan that does not require them to build different vehicles for

C AL . HEALTH & SAFETY C ODE §§ 43150–43156 (West 2012).
See Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards, C TR. F OR C LIMATE & ENERGY
SOLUTIONS,
http://www.c2es.org/what_s_being_done/in_the_states/vehicle
_ghg_standard.cfm (last updated Oct. 31, 2011) (noting the difference between
California and federal emissions standards and how the EPA and California have
cooperated to enforce their respective standards).
97 See, e.g., C AL . DEP‘T OF MOTOR V EHICLES , F AST F ACT BROCHURE FFVR 29,
BEFORE BUYING A V EHICLE FROM OUT OF STATE —BE SURE YOU C AN REGISTER IT IN
C ALIFORNIA
(2010),
available
at
http://dmv.ca.gov/pubs/brochures
/fast_facts/ffvr29.htm (advising California residents to ensure any new vehicle
purchase is certified to meet California‘s smog law requirements).
98 See Ken Bensinger, California Emission Waiver Looms for Carmakers, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 19, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jan/19/business/fifueleconomy19 (stating that California‘s emission standards pose ―a nightmare
scenario for automakers, which argue that complying with the California guidelines would create regulatory headaches and a technology burden that could add
at least $1,000 and as much as $5,000 to the cost of each vehicle‖).
95
96
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different markets to comply with varying state laws.‖ 99 The Vice
President of the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, Gloria
Bergquist, praised the centralization of emission standards, noting
―[a] year ago, we were facing piecemeal policies set out by EPA,
DOT, and groups of different states. Our auto engineers cannot
design vehicles to different standards.‖ 100
Likewise, under a centralized GMO cultivation standard,
producers, manufacturers, and corporations will only have to
comply with one unified standard. 101 Importers and exporters will
not have to limit their resources, reroute supply lines, or change
the flow of commerce to comply with potentially conflicting
standards in each Member State. Finally, while individual
consumers may still have high costs of consumption based on their
personal preferences, a centralized GMO cultivation policy may
better standardize information and make the variety of food
choices easier to understand.
In sum, centralized decision-making over the cultivation of
GMOs is important because of the physical realities of the
European Union. While Member States have a key responsibility
to their citizens as sovereigns, Member States also have a
responsibility to each other. Unlike the United States, Member
States must balance between regulation as distinct sovereigns and
regulation to ―ensure the economic and social progress of [the]
States by common action to eliminate the barriers which divide
Europe.‖ 102 The spillover cost of contamination and the transaction
costs in negotiating between pro-GMO and anti-GMO states affect
the EU in a unique way because the Member States physically
neighbor each other and economically strive for uniformity. ―If
Member States can opt out of a product approval system simply

99 John M. Broder, U.S. Issues Limits on Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Cars,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/02/science
/earth/02emit.html.
100 Id.
101 See Coase, supra note 93, at 16 (―Within the firm individual bargains between the various cooperating factors of production are eliminated and for a market transaction is substituted an administrative decision. The rearrangement of
production then takes place without the need for bargains between the owners of
the factors of production.‖). In the EU‘s case, bargaining withi n the European
Community would reduce the costs of bargaining between indivi dual Member
States.
102 TFEU, supra note 40, at pmbl.
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because of political preference,‖ however, ―the result will be more
uncertainty and less choice for farmers.‖ 103 Once GMOs are
cultivated in one area, there is little a neighboring state can do to
avoid their effects. Centralization obligates the neighboring states
to make the decision together.
4.

THE CASE AGAINST DECENTRALIZED DECISION-MAKING OVER
GMO CULTIVATION

The EU‘s proposal to decentralize GMO cultivation will
encourage Member States to move forward under different
economic and agricultural policies, dividing the EU‘s common
marketplace and disincentivizing a cooperative, cohesive approach
to agriculture. Additionally, the EU‘s proposal does not address
the WTO‘s 2006 decision regarding GMO application approval. As
such, although decentralized regulation may address concerns that
centralization cannot, it is ultimately not an appropriate response
to the particular issues raised by GMO cultivation in the EU.
4.1. The EU’s Proposal May Not Actually Allow Member States to
Decide Whether to Cultivate GMOs
In September 2011, the Court of Justice of the European Union
ruled on Monsanto SAS‘s and other GMO companies‘ complaint
regarding a French law that suspended the transfer, use, and
planting of MON 810 maize seed varieties. 104 The Court held that
Member States may not prohibit or suspend the sale of GMO seeds
authorized for cultivation under Directive 90/220 and existing

103 EU Lawmakers Give Backing for National GM Crop Bans, REUTERS , Jul. 5,
2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/05/us-eu-gmocultivation-idUSTRE7644UD20110705 (quoting Carel du Marchie Sarvaas of EuropaBio, an EU biotech industry association).
104 See Joined Cases C-58/10 to C-68/10, Monsanto SAS v. Ministre de l'Agriculture et de la Pêche, EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 62010CJ0058, ¶ 2 (Sept. 8, 2011),
available
at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri
=CELEX:62010CJ0058:EN:HTML (establishing the issues of the case). The French
law was Article L.535-2 of the French Code de l‘environnement, which allowed
the government to suspend or withdraw a GMO‘s authorization, impose modifications, or order the destruction if a ―new evaluation of the risks to public health
or the environment caused by the presence of [GMOs] so justifies.‖ Id. ¶ 24 (quoting Article L.535-2 of the French Code de l‘Environnement, which is in force until
June 27, 2008).
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products under Regulation Number 1829/2003. 105 Member States
could only prohibit the sale of authorized GMO seeds under
―emergency measures‖ after demonstrating the ―existence of a
situation which is likely to constitute a clear and serious risk to
human health, animal health or the environment.‖ 106 Once the EU
approves a GMO material, in other words, a Member State cannot
block the GMO without providing new and dependable
information that the GMO is harmful. 107 As one commenter noted,
―In principle, this judgement [sic] should therefore make it more
difficult for Member States to unilaterally block approvals that
have been granted at the EU level.‖ 108 While the full effect of this
decision on the EU‘s proposal and a Member State‘s ability to ban
the cultivation of a not-yet-approved GMO is still unknown, a
Member State‘s actual ability to independently regulate the
movement of an approved GMO continues to be limited. 109
Although the proposal may allow Member States to initially decide
whether or not to cultivate GMOs, the full legal impact of other
GMO regulations may ultimately obstruct their decision.
The proposal to decentralize the decision to cultivate GMOs,
furthermore, may be ineffective because it does not address the
105 Id. ¶ 63. Directive 90/220 provides for the European Community‘s authorization of GMOs that will be intentionally released into the environment, such
as occurs during cultivation. Id. ¶ 5. Regulation Number 1829/2003 provides for
authorization of GMO products to be used as source material for the production
of feed. Id. ¶ 11.
106 Id. ¶ 81.
107 See Press Release, Sidley Austin LLP, Court of Justice Affirms Primacy of
EU in Suspending GMO Approvals (Sept. 27, 2011), available at
http://m.sidley.com/court-of-justice-affirms-primacy-of-eu-in-suspending-gmoapprovals-09-27-2011/ (summarizing the Court of Justice‘s decision and its interpretation of emergency measures as referring to ―significant risk which clearly jeopardizes human health, animal health or the environment‖) (emphasis in original).
108 Id.
109 See Council Directive 2002/53, art. 16, 2002 O.J. (L 193) 6, 7 (EC) (forbidding Member States from placing marketing restrictions on a variety of approved
agricultural plant species except GMOs, for which limitations are allowed only if
the variety could be ―harmful . . . [to] plant health,‖ does not correspond to the
original approved species, or if there is another valid reason based on ―a risk for
human health or the environment‖); see also Press Release, EUROPA, GM Feed Ban:
Commission Takes Poland to the EU Court of Justice (March 14, 2011), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/292 (announcing the EU‘s decision to bring Poland to the Court of Justice for passing a law that
will prohibit the production and marketing of GMO animal feed in violation of
Regulation No. 1829/2003).
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WTO‘s 2006 decision or comply with the SPS Agreement. 110 The
July 5, 2011 amendments enumerated several reasons Member
States may exclude GMOs, including ―other grounds that may
include land use, town and country planning, or other legitimate
factors.‖ 111 The SPS Agreement, however, dictates that ―Members
shall ensure that any sanitary or phytosanitary measure is applied
only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life
or health, is based on scientific principles and is not maintained without
sufficient scientific evidence . . . .‖ 112 To comply with the SPS
Agreement, any basis for excluding GMO cultivation must still be
based on sufficient scientific principles, regardless of the EU‘s
enumerated reasons.113
U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk recognized the
shortcomings of the EU proposal well before the non-scientific
reasons were listed in the amendment. 114 Kirk notes: ―[w]hat we
want in every case is an open, transparent process that conforms
with international, scientific standards, and you‘re not going to be
able to do that if you have member states all coming up with their

110 See supra Section 2.1 (discussing the WTO panel report and the SPS
agreement).
111 2011 Amended Proposal, supra note 39, amend. 16. See supra notes 39–46
and accompanying text (providing a detailed discussion of the amendments to the
2001 Directive); see also Brussels Supports Decentralised GM Crop Proposal, INT ‘L C TR.
FOR
TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV . (July 11, 2011), http://ictsd.org
/i/news/biores/110309/ (observing that ―[c]ritics fear that the legislation will
lead to fragmentation of internal EU policies, uncertainty for farmers and incompatibility with WTO law‖).
112 SPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 2(2) (emphasis added). The SPS Agreement further notes:

In assessing the risk to animal or plant life or health . . . Members shall
take into account as relevant economic factors: the potential damage in
terms of loss of production or sales in the event of the entry, establishment or spread of a pest or disease; the costs of control or eradication in
the territory of the importing Member; and the relative cost-effectiveness
of alternative approaches to limiting risks.
Id. art. 5(3).
113 This is assuming that Member States will be held to the SPS Agreement by
other signatories, such as the United States, Argentina, and Canada, regardless of
whether the country provides non-sanitary reasons for banning GMOs.
114 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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own rules.‖ 115 Member States have also raised concerns regarding
the proposal. The Italian Agricultural Minister Giancarlo Galan
said that ―Italy opposes the ‗each on his own‘ logic that involves
fragmenting Europe‘s common agricultural policies . . . [t]he GMO
theme is too important to be left up to the decisions of individual
countries.‖ 116 France‘s Minister of Food, Agriculture and Fishing,
Bruno Lemaire, has agreed: ―[d]ecisions taken at a national level
are not reassuring either for [EU] citizens or for Europe.‖ 117 France
has furthermore ―expressed the worry that the proposal could
leave‖ Member States vulnerable to WTO challenges, 118 and the
European Council‘s internal legal service has noted that ―the
proposal may violate the national treatment principle in the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade . . . .‖ 119
Representative Kirk and the Member States‘ concern may be
well founded. A shadow draftsman of the 2011 amendment, Bart
Staes (Belgium), has stated: ―clearly an EU-wide moratorium
would give the greatest certainty to the member states and clear
majority of citizens that are opposed to GMO cultivation.
However, this vote would give greater legal certainty to countries
or regions wishing to introduce bans and, as such, is a step
forward.‖ 120 It is difficult to imagine that the WTO‘s decision—that
the EU‘s de facto moratorium on GMOs was an ―across-the-board
marketing ban‖ and violated the SPS Agreement 121 —can be
remedied with a proposal that makes it easier for Member States to
introduce bans.
Lastly, the EU‘s proposal has yet to address the WTO‘s
mandate to the EU to process GMO applications ―without undue

115 USTR Kirk Flags Problem with EU GMO Cultivation Policy on New Bans, 16
INSIDE WASHINGTON‘S FDA WEEK (Inside Health Policy, Washington, D.C.), Aug. 6,
2010, at 12.
116 Italian Agriculture Minister Argues Decisions on GMOs Must be EU-Wide,
BBC MONITORING EUROPE , Sept. 28, 2010.
117 Id.
118 Commission ‘Opt-Out’ Proposal on GMO Cultivation Largely Deadlocked, 29
INSIDE U.S. TRADE , Oct. 7, 2011.
119 Id.
120 European Parliament Paves Way for GMO Crop Bans, ACT MEDIA (Dec. 7,
2011), http://www.actmedia.eu/2011/07/12/top+story/european+parliament
+paves+way+for+gmo+crop+bans/34643.
121 Panel Report, supra note 2, at 41.
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delay.‖ 122
While the EU‘s legislative process is certainly a
necessary ―delay,‖ the proposal is just that—a proposal—five years
after the WTO‘s decision. As EuropaBio complained in October
2011 to EU policymakers: ―[t]he EU authorization process for GM
products takes substantially longer than comparable systems,
despite the fact that government processes around the world to
assess the safety and impact of GM products are essentially the
same . . . .‖ 123 Since 2007, the number of GM crops awaiting
approval has risen from around fifty to seventy-two, including
twenty-one applications for cultivation, and is expected to be over
ninety pending approvals by 2015. 124
4.2. Decentralization May Run Counter to the Common Market
At its core, decentralization of GMO cultivation ―runs counter
to the principle of a unified EU market‖ 125 and EU competition
principles. The Common Market demands ―concerted action in
order to guarantee steady expansion, balanced trade, and fair
competition.‖ 126 The debates surrounding GMOs and GMO
labeling laws, however, indicate that certain Member States and
markets will be inherently discriminatory towards GMO and nonGMO products.127 GMOs do provide certain benefits that make
them cheaper to grow and more affordable to buy. For example,

122 See Council Conclusions on Genetically Modified Organisms, supra note
34, at 2 (stating that improvement of the implementation of the legal fram ework in
order to better meet the objectives of the EC legislation necessitates continuing
processing applications without undue delays).
123 Charlie Dunmore, Biotech Firms Warn EU Over Pace of GM Crop Approvals,
REUTERS, Oct. 11, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011
/10/11/us-eu-gmo-approvals-idUSTRE79A3G520111011; see also Damien Geradin, The European Community: Environmental Issues in an Integrated Market, in THE
GREENING OF TRADE LAW: INTERNATIONAL TRADE ORGANIZATIONS AND
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 117, 129 (Richard H. Steinberg ed., 2002) (―Inconsistent
member state product standards may fragment the market, increase transaction
costs, and generate diseconomies of scale for all producers.‖).
124 Dunmore, supra note 123.
125 Commission ‘Opt-Out’ Proposal on GMO Cultivation Largely Deadlocked, supra
note 118 (noting Germany and Spain‘s opposition to the European Commission‘s
opt-out proposal on GMO cultivation).
126 TFEU, supra note 40, pmbl.
127 For an example of this debate as highlighted by differing laws between
two neighboring countries, see discussion supra Section 3.3 (contrasting Hungary‘s firm anti-GMO legislation with Romania‘s pro-GMO legislation).
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GMO cultivation can increase crop production and productivity, 128
and some GMO varieties can thrive under adverse conditions. 129
Moreover, many GMOs are bred pesticide-ready or pesticideresistant,130 and can be engineered to have lower fungal toxins or
an increased shelf life. 131 Because GMO producers have more
control over pests and yield numbers, their products can be
cheaper than their non-GMO counterparts.
As such, imported GMO products will most likely be less
expensive than their traditionally grown local counterparts in
countries that ban GMO cultivation. Importing cheaper GMO
foods (which Member States must allow)132 inherently undercuts
domestic products and unfairly competes with local agriculture,
which would be legally barred from growing the less expensive
GMO. As GMO domestic markets develop, the products of
countries that do not cultivate GMOs will be more expensive than
their imported counterparts from pro-GMO countries.
This expected price discrepancy may lead to competition issues
between Member States in violation of several principles laid out in
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Notably,
any ―restriction or distortion of competition within the internal
market‖ is prohibited by Article 101. 133 Although Article 101 is

128 Panel Report, supra note 2, at 28–29 (quoting FAO Statement on Biotechnology, U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., http://www.fao.org/biotech/fao-statement-onbiotechnology/en).
129 See Katharine A. Van Tassel, Genetically Modified Plants Used for Food, Risk
Assessment and Uncertainty Principles: Does the Transition from Ignorance to Indete rminacy Trigger the Need for Post-Market Surveillance?, 15 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 220,
226 (2009) (noting that a GM tomato plant has been engineered to grow in high
salinity soil in which ordinary plants would not otherwise grow).
130 See, e.g., id. at 232–33 (discussing GM peas that were engineered to contain
a green bean protein which ―inhibits weevils from digesting starch which causes
the weevils to starve to death‖).
131 See Valery Federici, Genetically Modified Food and Informed Consumer Choice:
Comparing U.S. and E.U. Labeling Laws, 35 BROOK . J. INT ‘L L. 515, 523–24 (2010) (noting that certain genetic modifications ―have produced many important benefits,
including lower average levels of fungal toxins on produce [and] increased shelf
life‖).
132 See supra note 6 and accompanying text (noting that the adopted EU Proposal of 2010 regarding GMO foods prohibits Member States from interrupting
the free flow of GMOs).
133 TFEU, supra note 40, art. 101(1). See also id. pmbl (recognizing a desire to
promote fair competition throughout the Common Market).
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traditionally read to concern companies and undertakings, 134 the
treaty prohibits all ―concerted practices which may affect trade
between Member States . . . which have as their object or effect the
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition.‖ 135 A Member
State‘s decision to cultivate GMOs would inherently distort
competition of its domestic goods and domestic companies. While
all regulations affect competition on some level, decentralized
decision-making over GMO cultivation would acutely harm
competition in the Common Market. Member States that do not
allow GMO cultivation would be forced to accept dissimilar
conditions between locally grown traditional crops and imported
GMOs, which will put local agriculture perpetually at a
competitive disadvantage.136
The potential risks posed by GMOs further exacerbate this
competitive disadvantage. While it is beyond the scope of this
Comment to explore the scientific theories or the full economic
advantages or disadvantages of GMOs, conducting a cost-benefit
analysis pertaining to use of GMOs is an important consideration
when evaluating competitive advantages. Countries that allow
GMO cultivation are not only gaining potential advantages, 137 but
are also exposing themselves and their neighbors to potential risks
of cross-contamination. 138 Decentralization of cultivation allows a
country that chooses to cultivate GMOs to reap the benefits while
exposing neighboring nations to the costs. Such costs, for example,
include reported incidents in which pesticide and herbicide-ready
GMOs have actually increased the need for stronger chemicals as
pests and weeds become resistant or are contaminated with GMO
134 See, e.g., Application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (Formerly Articles 81 and 82
of the EC Treaty), EUROPA, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/competition
/firms/l26092_en.htm (last updated Mar. 14, 2011) (summarizing ―the new arrangements for applying the antitrust procedures . . . introduced by Council
Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 . . . in the interests of consumers and businesses,
while easing the administrative burden of firms doing business in Europe‖).
135 TFEU, supra note 40, art. 101(1) (emphasis added).
136 Article 101 expressly prohibits application of ―dissimilar conditions to
equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a co mpetitive disadvantage.‖ TFEU, supra note 40, art. 101(1)(d).
137 See supra notes 119–22 and accompanying text (describing proposed moratoria on GMO cultivation in order to limit potential gains by countries that allow
GMO cultivation).
138 See discussion supra Section 3.1 (discussing spillover effects of GMO
transboundary contamination).
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genes.139 Resistant weeds and pests not only affect farmers using
biotechnology, but also jeopardize the natural insecticides used by
organic farmers. 140 Other risks include allergic or toxic reactions to
GM foods,141 reactions of cross-breeding high allergen foods with
low allergen foods, 142 and antibiotic resistance in people and
animals caused by widespread consumption of GMOs containing
antibiotic marker genes, 143 all of which could be incorporated into
the genes of traditionally grown crops via cross-pollination.
Finally, cross-pollination contamination between GMOs and nontarget organisms, such as wild plants or neighboring crops, could
drastically reduce biodiversity.144 The eradication of target and
non-target pest populations may harm the ecosystem in unknown
ways,145 and some studies have suggested that GMOs may have a

139 See First Documented Case of Pest Resistance to Biotech Cotton, SCI. DAILY,
(Feb.
7,
2008),
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/02
/080207140803.htm (reporting that bollworms, a major cotton pest, were disco vered in Missouri and Arkansas to have evolved resistance to Bt, a toxin engineered in certain GM crops to kill insects); see also William Neuman & Andrew
Pollack, Farmers Cope with Roundup-Resistant Weeds, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/04/business/energy-environment
/04weed.html?%ED%AF%80%ED%B2%AB (describing the proliferation of ten
species of pesticide-resistant weeds over twenty-two states and the need to spray
pesticide-ready fields with more toxic chemicals).
140 See Van Tassel, supra note 129, at 226–27 (listing various risks that are
posed to ecosystems by the use of GM plants).
141 See, e.g., GM Peas Cause Immune Response—A Gap in the Approval Process?,
GMO C OMPASS (Jan. 3, 2006), http://www.gmo-compass.org/eng/news/stories
/175.gm_peas_australia_cause_immune_response.html (noting that an Australian
private research facility discovered that a protein in GM peas produced an allergic
reaction in mice, which could potentially produce an allergic reaction in humans).
Notably, there are no reports proving the existence of these types of reactions in
humans.
142 See, e.g., Federici, supra note 131, at 540 (highlighting voluntary labeling
statements and indicating that cross-breeding a food a consumer is not allergic to,
such as a tomato, with a food the consumer is allergic to, such as a Brazil nut, may
produce a GM tomato to which the consumer is allergic).
143 See Panel Report, supra note 2, at 32 (noting that the European Communities food safety concerns about GMOs affected the EC‘s approval regime).
144 See id. at 66 (―Potential harmful effects on the environment . . . include
non-target effects, invasiveness and development of resistance, unintended effects
arising through GMO related management practices, and effects on bi odiversity.‖)
145 See Lee Stockhorst, Note, Super Crops or a Super Problem? The Battle Over Bt
Corn, 15 MO. ENVTL . L. & POL ‘Y REV . 531, 545 (2008) (―While Bt products are created to target specific crop-destroying insects, there is nothing to say that other,
non-target insects, will not ingest the Bt toxin. This process could threaten the
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reduced or negative nutritional impact. 146 In short, the decision to
cultivate GMOs is not an easy one, and allowing Member States to
independently decide whether or not to cultivate GMOs creates
two separate markets with distinct cost-benefit frameworks.
If the EU‘s proposal does prove to be an effective vehicle by
which Member States can decide whether or not to cultivate GMOs
on their soil, the Common Market will split between GMO goods
and non-GMO goods, creating unfair competition between
imported GMO and local non-GMO goods in countries that choose
to ban cultivation.
Given the potential advantages and
disadvantages that GMOs present Member States, coupled with
the spillover effect of cross-pollination, only a centralized decisionmaking body can fully weigh EU-wide costs and benefits of
cultivating GMOs and protect the free movement of European
foodstuffs.
5.

CONCLUSION

Although a decentralized system of government may more
simply address GMOs and the scientific uncertainty surrounding
their long-term effects, a centralized approval system would best
address the unique concerns of the EU while still complying with
the WTO‘s 2006 decision. Centralization reduces the risk of one
country being harmed by another county‘s decision whether to
cultivate GMOs. If Member States are acting together, the costs
associated with the spillover effect of cross-pollination could be
uniformly allowed or discouraged, depending on the EU-wide
policy on that GMO. A consistent position on cultivating a GMO,
furthermore, will decrease transaction costs by reducing the
potentially incalculable information, inspection, and import and
export costs, as well as discourage discrimination between GMO
and non-GMO crops. By continuing a unified GMO policy, the EU
as a whole will be better armed to confront pressures from the
international community and address issues of contamination.

survival of hundreds of insect species, not to mention the potential unbalance in
the ecosystem that could result from an insect species being eradicated in a particular area.‖).
146 See Strauss, supra note 1, at 779 (discussing the potential risks of GMOs
and the substantial scientific uncertainty surrounding biotechnology).
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It is important to note that the WTO decision only determined
that the EU was not in compliance with one article and one annex
of the SPS Agreement and did not make substantive findings
regarding GMOs.147 By establishing clear, non-arbitrary standards
based on the precautionary principle148 in order to approve or
disapprove GMOs without undue delay, the EU may satisfy the
WTO while also responding to the issues surrounding GMOs.
A Communitywide approval system may find that, contrary to
European public opinion, GMOs are acceptable and should be
approved for cultivation in all or parts of the EU despite the risks.
A unified front on GMOs, however, will best preserve the structure
of the EU and the Common Market, and will allow for more
comprehensive regulation of GMO trade and cultivation. By
identifying and remedying possible issues surrounding GMOs, the
EU can present a united front against outside pressures and better
regulate and protect at home.

147 See generally Panel Report, supra note 2, at 1067–69 (concluding that while
the Panel did not examine the safety of biotech products, it did examine whether
European Communities acted inconsistently as to the requirements of the SPS
Agreement).
148 See TFEU, supra note 40, art. 191(2) (―Union policy on the environment
shall aim at a high level of protection taking into account the diversity of situations in the various regions of the Union. It shall be based on the precautionary
principle and on the principles that preventive action should be taken, that env ironmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source and that the polluter
should pay.‖).
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